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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

National Intelligence Officers

31 January 1980
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MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

VIA: Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment
National Intelligence Officer for Warning

FROM: Joe L. Zaring
National Intelligence Officer for Western Europe

SUBJECT: Monthly Warning Assessment: Western Europe

EUROPE-AFGHANISTAN

1. The Europeans seem increasingly more inclined to believe that the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan could ultimately threaten vital Western interests. They have condemned the Soviet move, and they have taken various steps intended to show that such moves have a cost. But they are and will likely remain reluctant -- the UK rather less so than the others -- to take forceful measures against the Soviets in the framework of European-Soviet relations.

2. The Europeans hope to preserve the European dimension of East-West detente as far as possible, especially the remaining prospects for arms control which for them has become an essential ingredient of their security. Most European officials also believe that the most effective strategy for the West will be to shore up nearby states, where possible, to deter further Soviet moves in the region.

3. While the Europeans will be willing to strengthen their own ties with Turkey and Yugoslavia -- and perhaps the Arab Gulf states, Pakistan, and India -- they may be tempted increasingly to assume that the US has the prime responsibility for addressing the Soviet threat as such. While such division of responsibility may pay some dividends, it may also encourage the Europeans' tendency -- evident in the present crisis -- to distance themselves somewhat from US actions and to emphasize European forums for coordinating policies on pressing issues like sanctions and aid.

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4. The Europeans' approach raises serious question what NATO's role should be in managing crises that are outside its traditional area of responsibility but that affect the global balance of power in ways more or less directly linked to European interests. While it is not clear that a European preference for a more independent role in such crises -- fostered partly by the decline of confidence in US leadership -- would necessarily threaten US interests, we see some greater risk that:

- an excess of US "pressure" to join in an anti-Soviet policy could lead to US-European recriminations;
- Soviet arguments that the US shares responsibility for heightened East-West tensions could in such circumstances fall on more fertile ground.

ITALY

5. Christian Democratic party leaders are maneuvering to avoid a direct confrontation with the Socialists that could result in the collapse of the Cossiga government after the DC congress in mid-February. Even if the Socialists bring down the government, Cossiga and his party probably hope that consultations aimed at forming a new government will spill over into the official campaign for nationwide local elections in late spring. Cossiga might then remain as caretaker until the parties have reassessed their relative positions after the vote.

6. Unless the PCI does badly in the elections, its prospects for some form of participation in a government of national unity seem strong, given the disarray and shift to the left in the Socialist Party and the Communists' considerable success in using current international tensions to distance themselves further from the Soviet Union.

TURKEY

7. The Turkish generals' letter to President Koruturk has encouraged the major parties to take a somewhat more responsible position in parliament, especially on anti-terrorism legislation. But serious practical difficulties -- shortages of fuel and perhaps ultimately food -- as well as continued political bickering constitute dangers great enough to topple Demirel nevertheless and bring in a government of national unity.

8. Turkey now seems bound to win increased attention from the West -- as well as the East -- because of new international tensions. But attention alone will not make its domestic situation any easier, and Turkey will

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probably become an even harder bargainer for aid. Because of its desperate need for help from any quarter, and for oil in particular, it will be very cautious about what role it may undertake to play for the West vis-a-vis the Soviets and the Moslem world.

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